Houston value-add multifamily syndicator, vertically integrated under Disrupt Group with its own property manager and renovation contractor. 30 acquisitions across Texas, Georgia and Florida; 21 communities owned as of Q4 2025. Founded 2017.
CaveatA verified LP review reports an expected total Class B loss on a co-sponsored Houston deal, against the sponsor's published 'no investor capital lost' claimjump ↓
CREsponsor scorecard
A standardized public-record assessment. Select any scored lens or profile factor to inspect the cited evidence.
Geographic concentration
01
Texas-anchored · 3 states
Profile factor
Thirty acquisitions across Texas, Georgia and one Florida asset, Houston-dominant. Concentrated in exactly the markets that repriced hardest after 2022: density is real, diversification is not.
Awards
02
52/100
Limited
Two genuine growth honors: Inc. 5000 (2022) and the Houston Business Journal Fast 100 at #7: sit on the same wall as three awards from pay-to-list magazines. Almost everything dates to 2021–2022.
Online reputation
03
55/100
Mixed
Residents rate 3.64/5 across 2,302 Google reviews at 8 of 21 communities: the base rate for Class B value-add. The LP side is the outlier, but rests on a single verified review reporting a total loss.
Team expertise
04
80/100
Deep public record
A real C-suite for a syndicator this size: a chief legal officer whose prior role appears in an SEC filing, a tax-specialist CFO, a 25-year president. Neither founder came from institutional real estate.
Risk screen
05
50/100
Material findings
No enforcement, bankruptcy or foreclosure found. Against that: a pending wrongful-death suit touching the management arm, and an LP reporting a Class B loss the sponsor says never happened.
Differentiator
06
Three-company operating stack
Profile factor
Disrupt Group runs the capital arm, the manager (Emerge Living) and the renovation contractor (Stealth) as one house: which is how a 376-unit refinance shows an $8,777-per-unit reno cost in an SEC filing.
Sources of capital
07
Retail syndicate + co-GPs
Profile factor
Rule 506(b) raises at $25K–$100K minimums, with up to eight co-sponsor LLCs on one deal. A 2018 offering accepted non-accredited investors. No institutional LP appears anywhere in the record.
Scores are CREsponsor editorial assessments of the cited public record, not ratings by any regulator. Methodology · Report a correction.
Profile factor
Track record and realized returns
Track recordPublished but untested
Disrupt Equity publishes per-deal realized returns, which is more than most syndicators do. The problem is not the disclosure: it is the vintage: every exit predates the rate cycle that repriced this asset class.
Disrupt Equity is unusually forthcoming for a private syndicator: it publishes a realized-deals page with hold periods, equity multiples, cash-on-cash yields and average annual returns, deal by deal. Read it closely and one fact dominates everything else on this page.
All eight published exits closed between September 2018 and December 2021. Not one asset bought at 2021 or 2022 pricing has gone full cycle at a disclosed price. The 35% average annual return the firm advertises was earned entirely in the cheapest-capital era in modern multifamily history, on 1960s and 1970s Beaumont, San Antonio and Atlanta product bought between 2016 and 2019. It is a real record. It is not evidence about the current portfolio.
Huntington Park Beaumont, TX · 92 units · sold Sep 2018182.5% ·
Longfellow Apartments Beaumont, TX · 139 units · sold Oct 201952% ·
Central Park 90 units · sold Aug 202141% ·
Retreat at Stone Mountain Stone Mountain, GA · 212 units · sold Nov 202137% ·
Woods of Decatur Atlanta, GA · 99 units · sold Oct 201957% ·
Marketplace Square Atlanta, GA · 152 units · sold May 202126% ·
Alamo Oaks San Antonio, TX · 282 units · sold Dec 202122.11% ·
Beaumont Heights Beaumont, TX · 265 units · sold Oct 202114.25% ·
Average annual returns exactly as published on the sponsor's realized-deals page: self-reported and unaudited, with no third-party performance audit available. Bars show AAR, not IRR. Note the concentration: strip out Huntington Park and the remaining seven average roughly 36% AAR, all realized before 2022. disruptequity.com realized deals
What the 2020s vintage actually looks like, from filings rather than marketing. Two SEC-filed CMBS offering documents give an outside read on live assets:
Rayford's Edge, 376 units, Spring TX
Acquired Oct 2022 · $3.3M renovation ($8,777/unit, 263 units) · refinanced 2026 at $33.0MWFCM 2026-5C10
Read those two side by side and the picture is neither disaster nor triumph. Parkwyn at 56% leverage and 1.38x coverage is conservatively financed. Rayford’s Edge at 1.20x coverage and an 8.5% debt yield is thin: it clears debt service with little room, on an asset bought in October 2022 and renovated at under $9,000 a door. Both are fixed-rate securitized loans rather than the floating-rate bridge debt that broke the Nitya Capital and S2 Capital portfolios, and the sponsor says four properties were refinanced into long-term fixed-rate loans in Q4 2025 alone. That refinancing is the most consequential thing Disrupt Equity has done since 2022, and it is why this profile does not read like those two.
The deal that did not work. In December 2021 Disrupt Equity and Open Door Capital jointly bought the Heights on Katy, a 387-unit Class A community at 7105 Old Katy Road in Houston, for roughly $70 million (per the sponsor’s own release). In February 2026 the asset was sold to PCCP in partnership with Alliance Residential; the buyers took a $50.2 million acquisition loan from Walton Street Capital (per Multi-Housing News, citing Yardi Matrix). The sale price was not disclosed, so the equity outcome cannot be computed from public records. What is public is one side of it: a verified limited partner wrote in January 2026 that, having declined a capital call, they expected their entire Class B position to be lost on that deal (review at Invest Clearly). See Risk screen for how that sits against the sponsor’s own published position.
Profile factor
Geographic footprint
Geographic concentrationTexas-anchored · 3 states
Built from the sponsor's own 30-property portfolio page and cross-checked against Form D issuer names and trade-press coverage of individual deals.
Thirteen of the thirty properties Disrupt Equity has acquired sit in greater Houston, with clusters in San Antonio, Beaumont, Austin and the Atlanta metro and a single Florida asset in Daytona. The firm calls itself a Sun Belt operator; in practice it is a Houston operator with satellites, and its non-Texas exposure is almost entirely Atlanta.
That density is a genuine operating advantage: it is what makes an in-house manager and an in-house renovation crew economic at 5,000 units rather than 50,000. It is also undiversified in exactly the wrong direction for the 2022–2025 cycle: Houston, Austin and Atlanta all absorbed heavy new supply, and Austin in particular saw the sharpest rent declines of any major US market over that stretch.
All 30 acquisitions listed on the sponsor's portfolio page as of 2026-07-26, grouped by metro. The sponsor separately reports owning 21 communities in its Q4 2025 update: the difference is exits and, in at least one case, a disposition at an undisclosed price. disruptequity.com portfolio
Scored on public track record: depth of verifiable history for each seat, not competence. Where a bio claim is corroborated by an SEC filing rather than only the sponsor's site, that lifts the card. Reading all five profiles on 2026-07-30 found the two most senior non-founder seats to be held by a president out of Hines, Camden Property Trust and a Blackstone portfolio company, and a chief legal officer with fifteen years at an NYSE-listed company, against founders who came from software and IT services.
Behind the 66/100: the back office is stronger than the front. Disrupt Equity has a chief legal officer whose prior role is documented in a public company’s 8-K, a CFO with a two-decade tax and partnership-accounting career, and a president brought in with 25 years of fund and operating experience. What it does not have is an acquisitions team with institutional pedigree: the co-founders came from software and IT sales, and their real estate history begins with the firm itself. That is not disqualifying for a value-add syndicator; it is the honest reason this score is not in the 80s.
Beyond the carded five, the team page lists 17 people, including David Hudgins (Senior Managing Director of Investments, previously CFO of an entertainment-equipment rental firm he co-founded, and a real estate investor since 2007), Tarek Moussa (Managing Director, Capital Markets), Dan Phelan (Director of Acquisitions), Nick Parshall (Senior Director of Asset Management) and Dexter Campbell (Senior Director of Capital Formation). Four of the seventeen sit in capital raising or investor relations.
Published contact points: the firm directs investor questions to invest@disruptequity.com on its own site, at 757 N. Eldridge Parkway, Suite 900, Houston, TX 77079: the address that also appears on every recent Form D.
Public-record assessment
Risk screen
Editorial score50/100
Screens run 2026-07-26: SEC EFTS and enforcement, IAPD, CourtListener federal dockets, per-executive lookups, and a press sweep. Allegations in pending litigation are reported with their posture; no finding of liability exists in any matter below.
Behind the 50/100: on conduct, the screens that ran came back clean: no enforcement, no regulatory disclosure, no bankruptcy. Foreclosure is the exception and it is untested, because the county screen has not run against the single-asset LLCs, so nothing on this page speaks to asset-level distress either way. On outcomes, two things keep the score at the midpoint. First, a pending Harris County wrongful-death action whose insurance-coverage sequel names the firm’s management affiliate. Second, and more central to an allocator: the firm publishes an absolute claim about investor capital that a verified LP account contradicts, and the deal in question sold at a price nobody outside has seen.
Clear SEC enforcement EDGAR full-text search across all form types returns 117 filings naming Disrupt Equity, plus 22 and 45 naming founders Ben Suttles and Feras Moussa. Every hit is a Form D or D/A for one of the sponsor's own vehicles; none is an enforcement matter. Control: the same unfiltered query returns 10,000+ on a common term. EDGAR full-text search
Finding Adviser registration / Form ADV No IAPD record exists for Disrupt Equity or any affiliate. The firm is not a registered or reporting adviser, so there is no Item 11 disclosure obligation and no fee brochure: the fee schedule, promote and waterfall are not public anywhere. Control (2026-07-29): the same IAPD endpoint returns Cortland Investment Management (299369), so this zero is proven, not an empty index. IAPD search
Finding Federal civil + bankruptcy dockets One matter: an insurers' declaratory-judgment action naming affiliate Disrupt Management, LLC over a duty to defend in a Harris County wrongful-death suit. No bankruptcy or receivership involving any Disrupt entity. CourtListener
Clear Per-executive enforcement + docket Feras Moussa, Ben Suttles and Benjamin Suttles each returned zero federal docket matches. No SEC action names either founder. CourtListener
Clear Special servicing (securitized loans) The firm's two securitized loans are fixed-rate and performing per their offering documents, real evidence, but it reaches only the two assets inside those CMBS trusts, not the rest of the portfolio. WFCM 2026-5C10
Clear Foreclosure (county records) Clean against controls in every county this book touches: Bexar, Travis, Tarrant, Harris and Georgia. Harris indexes pending trustee-sale postings on a surface with no name search, so a future posting could exist unseen, but nothing recorded was found. This row matters more than usual here, because the sponsor's 'never had a foreclosure' claim sits one row below against a contrary LP account. county clerk records
Finding Debt structure Rayford's Edge carries a 1.20x underwritten DSCR and 8.5% debt yield, thin coverage on a 2022-vintage acquisition. Parkwyn is materially safer at 1.38x and 56.0% LTV. Both are fixed-rate, unlike the floating-rate bridge debt that broke peer syndicators. WFCM 2025-5C5
Finding Investor-outcome claims The sponsor states it has never had a foreclosure and that no investor capital has ever been lost (Nov 2025). A verified LP review (Jan 2026) reports an expected 100% loss on a Class B position after a declined capital call. Both are on the record; neither has been adjudicated. Invest Clearly review
Finding Non-accredited investor exposure The 2018 Beaumont Heights Form D reports accepting non-accredited investors, permitted under Rule 506(b) but a heightened-disclosure posture. Every later filing reports accredited-only. Beaumont Heights Form D
Screens as of 2026-07-26.
Pending · no liability found · Disrupt Management is not a defendant in the underlying suitFiled 2025-12-29
U.S. District Court, S.D. Texas (Houston Division)
Two insurers asked a federal court whether they must defend Augusta North Houston, LLC, Augusta Apts Management, LLC and Disrupt Management, LLC in a Harris County suit alleging a tenant died on 2 September 2023 of mold exposure after a leak. Allegations only: no court has found liability. Identity is settled, the complaint giving Disrupt Management's agent as Disrupt Equity, LLC at its SEC address. The owner's members are Utah and Idaho citizens: third-party management, not a sponsored deal.
Case
Ohio Security Ins. Co. v. Augusta North Houston, LLC, 4:25-cv-06314
Relief sought
Declaration on duty to defend + indemnify
Underlying suit
Cause No. 202459856, 190th Judicial District Court, Harris County
Property
The Augusta Apartments, 12655 Kuykendahl Rd, Houston, not a Disrupt-owned asset
Asset sold Feb 2026 · price undisclosed · no litigation filedAcquired Dec 2021, sold Feb 2026
Heights on Katy: capital call, disclosed sale, disputed investor outcome
Houston, TX · no litigation
The deal anchoring most online commentary about this sponsor. Established: the purchase and sale in the table above, and an LP verified by Invest Clearly writing in January 2026 that he declined a capital call and expected to lose his Class B position. Not established: the sale price, so whether equity was impaired is unknown. A sale is not a foreclosure, and an expected loss on an unrealised position is not a realised one, which is how both accounts can be true.
Asset
387 units, 7105 Old Katy Road, Houston, built 2004
Acquisition
~$70M, Dec 2021, with Open Door Capital
Exit
Sold to PCCP + Alliance Residential, Feb 2026
Buyer financing
$50.2M Walton Street acquisition loan
A note on what is deliberately not here. Searching this sponsor’s name surfaces fraud accusations published on social media by a self-styled fraud investigator. No regulator, court, filing or credible news organisation has corroborated them, and CREsponsor does not repeat unadjudicated accusations against named individuals. What is reportable is the sponsor’s response: Disrupt Equity published a fraud-protection guide in December 2025 and a zero-foreclosures update in November 2025, both plainly written to occupy the search results those accusations generate. Reputation management is not evidence of wrongdoing; it is evidence that the firm knows the question is being asked.
Public-record assessment
Awards and designations
Editorial score52/100
Each claimed award traced to its granting body and sorted by whether that body has a competitive selection process or sells placement. Pay-to-list recognition does not lift the score.
Behind the 52/100: two of the nine claimed awards are meaningful, one is a credible finalist nomination, and three come from magazines whose business model is selling recognition. Everything except a 2025 GlobeSt listing dates to 2021–2022, the peak of the syndication cycle.
Per sponsorInc. 5000: America's Fastest-Growing Private CompaniesInc. magazine · 2022
A genuine, competitive, revenue-growth-based national list with published methodology. Two caveats: it measures revenue growth at the sponsor entity, not investor outcomes, and Disrupt Equity's homepage upgrades the claim to '#1 Fastest Growing Company in Houston by INC 5000' while its own awards page attributes the No. 7 ranking to a different list (the Houston Business Journal Fast 100). Recorded here as an Inc. 5000 listing, not a #1 finish.
Per sponsorHouston Business Journal Fast 100: ranked No. 7Houston Business Journal · 2022 · ranked by 2019–2021 revenue growth
A regional business-journal growth ranking with a defined metric (revenue growth 2019 to 2021). Real recognition, and the strongest verifiable placement on the wall, but again a measure of how fast the sponsor grew, not of what its investors earned.
Per sponsorEY Entrepreneur Of The Year: 2022 finalistErnst & Young · 2022 · finalist, not winner
A competitive, judged programme with a serious selection process. The sponsor is careful to describe this as a finalist placement rather than a win, which is to its credit.
Per sponsorGlobeSt Best Bosses in CRE: TeamsGlobeSt. Real Estate Forum · 2025
Trade-press editorial recognition, nomination-based, on the employer axis. The most recent honor on the wall and the only one from the last three years, per the firm's own Q4 2025 update.
Per sponsorThree pay-to-list magazine awardsBuild · Global Brands Magazine · World Economic Magazine · 2021–2022
'Best Multi-Family Real Estate Syndication Company, South Central USA' (Build), 'Fastest Growing Multifamily Real Estate Syndication 2021' (Global Brands Magazine) and 'Most Reputable Real Estate Investment Company, Texas 2022' (World Economic Magazine). These publications run awards programmes that solicit nominees and monetise winners through licensing. Grouped and disclosed rather than dropped, because a reader scanning nine logos should know which three carry no independent selection.
Two distinct populations: residents at the communities, and limited partners in the deals. They are scored separately because they can and do diverge.
Behind the 55/100: residents rate the portfolio at the base rate for its asset class, neither a red flag nor a differentiator. The LP-side signal is thin but negative, and it is the one an allocator is actually reading this page for.
Residents. An eight-community sample covering 2,302 Google reviews averages 3.64/5, review-count-weighted: squarely at the mid-3s base rate typical of large Class B and C workforce portfolios, so it is neither a strength nor a warning. Best in sample: Estates at Cypress, Houston (4.7/87) and Hollister Place, Houston (4.0/444). Weakest: Parkwyn Townhomes, North Richland Hills (3.2/269) and Rayford’s Edge, Spring (3.3/384), notably the two assets whose loans are securitized and therefore the two whose operating numbers are publicly underwritten.
All 8 sampled communities, Google rating (review count) →
Limited partners. Exactly one verified LP review exists, describing a declined capital call and an expected total Class B loss on a co-sponsored deal. One review is not a distribution and should not be read as one, but a firm that raised from a hundred-plus investors per vehicle across thirty deals having generated a single public LP review, and that one negative, is itself a data point about how visible this sponsor’s investor base is willing to be.
On the sponsor’s own reputation claims. The November 2025 update cites a 4.5-star Google rating, 5-star Glassdoor, and 5-star Yelp and Facebook ratings. The firm’s Google listing read 4.1 across 40 reviews when checked on 2026-07-26, and no Glassdoor figure was verifiable in this screen. That is a small gap, but on a page whose subject is verification it is worth stating.
Profile factor
The Disrupt Group stack
DifferentiatorThree-company operating stack
A structural claim earns a card here only when the public record shows it operating. This one is visible in a securitized loan document, which is the strongest form of confirmation available for a private operator.
Disrupt Equity is one of three companies under Disrupt Group: the capital and investment arm, Emerge Living (property management, which brands two of the portfolio’s communities), and Stealth Renovations (the construction and renovation contractor). The president appointed in January 2026 runs all three. The firm additionally reports in-house financing and multifamily insurance functions.
Why it matters, and how you can tell it is real. Vertical integration is the most-claimed and least-verified differentiator in syndication. Here it shows up in a place the sponsor does not control: the SEC-filed offering document for the Rayford’s Edge loan states that the borrower sponsors renovated 263 of 376 units for approximately $3.3 million, or $8,777 per unit, and made exterior upgrades, a per-door renovation cost roughly half what a third-party general contractor typically charges for a comparable scope. A sponsor that owns the renovation contractor captures that margin instead of paying it away, and it is the mechanism by which a 1981-vintage asset bought in October 2022 reached 95.5% occupancy by February 2026.
Nobody independent produces the numbers. When the sponsor, the manager and the contractor are the same house, the renovation invoices, the management fee and the occupancy report all come from parties with the same economic interest: there is no independent operator whose numbers an LP can triangulate against, and the fee stack that integration creates is not disclosed anywhere public. That is the cost of the model, and it is why the fees question below matters more here than at a sponsor using third-party managers.
Recent activity
2026-02Neutral
Heights on Katy sold to PCCP and Alliance Residential
Divestment
The 387-unit Class A Houston asset bought with Open Door Capital in December 2021 for roughly $70M changed hands; the buyers took a $50.2M Walton Street acquisition loan. Sale price undisclosed.
Published a 'zero foreclosures, no investor capital lost' update
Neutral
Reports 21 communities owned across TX, FL and GA and four properties refinanced into long-term fixed-rate loans during the quarter: the single most consequential operating fact the firm has disclosed since 2022.
673 units across Austin, Katy and Stafford via assumption of a $68M CMBS loan Nitya took in 2019; combined appraised value near $80M, Newmark-brokered. A verified transaction between two sponsors profiled on CREsponsor.
Investor counts, minimums and co-sponsor lists read directly from each vehicle's Form D. Institutional screens run against US public pensions, the Canadian Maple 8, Australian supers, UK schemes and sovereign wealth funds.
Every dollar of equity behind Disrupt Equity’s thirty acquisitions came from individual accredited investors under Rule 506(b), with no pension, sovereign fund, insurer or endowment anywhere in the public record, so individuals carry the entire loss if a deal impairs, as the Heights on Katy capital call showed. The fund experiment has not worked so far: three income-oriented funds launched in 2024 raised a combined $1.43 million against $70 million of registered offerings across ten investors, minimums run $25,000 to $100,000, and fees, promote and waterfall are not public.
How Disrupt Equity compares
REEP Equity: the nearest peer in size and structure: a Texas husband-and-wife syndicator with its own in-house manager. The instructive difference is disclosure: REEP publishes a 3% IRR result and two post-2022 exits on its own site.
Nitya Capital: the counterparty on Disrupt’s largest single acquisition, and the cautionary version of the same strategy: Houston-anchored value-add syndication that broke on floating-rate debt. Disrupt’s fixed-rate refinancing is the fork in the road between them.
S2 Capital: the same asset class at ten times the scale, and the fullest documented downside case in this directory.
Madera Residential and CAF Capital Partners: Texas multifamily sponsors with, respectively, an institutional JV history and named institutional LPs, which is the axis on which Disrupt Equity is thinnest.
Disrupt Equity says on its own site that it has acquired over $1 billion of multifamily real estate and 5,000-plus units, and delivered an average annualized return of 35% to investors. Two 2025–2026 SEC-filed CMBS offering documents describe the firm as having roughly $800 million of assets under management and approximately 5,000 units: the same figures The Real Deal reported in November 2023, meaning the headline has not moved in nearly three years. None of these numbers is audited or independently verified.
Who founded Disrupt Equity and who runs it?
Feras Moussa and Ben Suttles co-founded the firm; both are named as borrower sponsors and non-recourse carveout guarantors in SEC-filed CMBS documents. Moussa is a University of Texas computer-science graduate and former Microsoft program manager. Suttles reports 15-plus years in real estate private equity. Roman Stephens was appointed President of Disrupt Group in January 2026, Deborah Pritchard is CFO, and Michael Racusin is Chief Legal Officer.
Where is Disrupt Equity headquartered?
Houston, Texas: 757 N. Eldridge Parkway, Suite 900, the address on every recent SEC Form D filing and the registered-agent address for its affiliate Disrupt Management, LLC.
What is Disrupt Equity's investment strategy?
Value-add multifamily syndication across Texas, Georgia and Florida, typically 1960s–1980s Class B and C garden apartments bought with a renovation budget. Its Q4 2025 update says it owns and manages 21 communities. The platform is vertically integrated under Disrupt Group, which also owns the property manager (Emerge Living) and the renovation contractor (Stealth Renovations).
Who are Disrupt Equity's investors?
Individual accredited investors, raised deal by deal under Rule 506(b) at filed minimums of $25,000 to $100,000. No pension, sovereign wealth fund, insurer or endowment appears in any public record. Deals are frequently co-sponsored: the Hill at Woodway and Preferred Income Fund filings each name eight co-sponsor entities, including Open Door Capital, the firm founded by BiggerPockets' Brandon Turner.
What returns has Disrupt Equity actually realized?
Its own realized-deal page publishes eight full-cycle exits with equity multiples from 1.46x to 4.65x and average annual returns from 14.25% to 182.5%. Every one of those eight sold between September 2018 and December 2021: before the rate cycle turned. Nothing bought at 2021–2022 pricing has yet gone full cycle at a disclosed price, so the published track record does not test the current vintage. All figures are self-reported and unaudited.
What are Disrupt Equity's fees and minimum investment?
Filed minimums run $25,000 (Beaumont Heights, 2018), $75,000 (Ridley, Echelon Park), $100,000 (Hill at Woodway, the Preferred Income Funds, Diversified Cash Flow Fund) and $50,000 (Multifamily Fund IV, 2025), per each vehicle's SEC Form D. Fees, promote and the distribution waterfall are not public: the firm is not an SEC-registered investment adviser and files no Form ADV brochure, so those terms come from the PPM.
Has Disrupt Equity been sued or investigated?
No SEC enforcement action, regulatory disclosure or bankruptcy involving Disrupt Equity surfaced as of 2026-07-26. One federal matter names an affiliate: in Ohio Security Insurance Co. v. Augusta North Houston, LLC (S.D. Tex. 4:25-cv-06314, filed 2025-12-29), two insurers seek a declaration on whether they must defend and indemnify Disrupt Management, LLC in an underlying Harris County wrongful-death suit alleging a tenant died in September 2023 after mold exposure at a Houston complex Disrupt Management is alleged to have managed. Those are allegations in pending litigation; no liability has been found, and the underlying suit names the property's owner and its own manager, not Disrupt Management, as defendants.
Revision history4entries
The SEC-enforcement screen was re-run and its citation corrected. The previous screen cited an EDGAR full-text query filtered to `forms=AAER`, which cannot return a result for any term: AAER releases are SEC administrative publications, not EDGAR filings, so the filter selects a form type that does not exist. Verified by control: `the`, `fraud` and `securities` each return 0 under `forms=AAER` while the same terms unfiltered return 10,000+. The 117 filings naming Disrupt Equity, and the 22 and 45 naming Ben Suttles and Feras Moussa, are all Form D or D/A vehicle filings; no enforcement matter, so the verdict is unchanged and now supportable. Separately corrected the risk lede, which read 'no foreclosure surfaced against any Disrupt Equity asset' while the page's own foreclosure row sits at queued and says the screen has not run: the row itself notes the point matters here because the sponsor's 'never had a foreclosure' claim sits one row below against a contrary LP account. The lede now says distress is untested rather than clean.
Sources of capital condensed to a two-sentence statement with inline sources. The section had grown to 11-131 lines per page of LP cards, fund cards and audit trail; the facts that decide an allocation (who the capital comes from, and who absorbs a loss) were being carried by a slab most readers skip. Every claim and link in the short version is carried over from the long one, and the per-vehicle detail remains in git history, in the FAQ entries for minimums and fees, and in `sources[].gave:`. No score changed: the lens is value-mode and carries no weight in the hero grade.
Citation audit: corrected the LinkedIn company URL (the original 404'd) and repointed the $70M Heights on Katy acquisition figure from the sponsor's homepage to the specific closing announcement.
Initial publish. Government spine: 8 Reg D issuers (2018–2025) plus two SEC-filed CMBS term sheets carrying hard loan metrics, Rayford's Edge at $33.0M, 65.4% LTV, 1.20x DSCR, 8.5% debt yield (2026 refinance of a 2022 acquisition), and Parkwyn Townhomes at $23.25M, 56.0% LTV, 1.38x DSCR. Track record analysed from the sponsor's own realized-deals page: eight full-cycle exits, every one sold between September 2018 and December 2021, so the published 35% average annual return does not test a single 2021-vintage deal. Risk screen 50/100: no enforcement, bankruptcy or foreclosure found, offset by a pending Harris County wrongful-death suit whose insurance-coverage action names affiliate Disrupt Management, LLC, and by the tension between the sponsor's 'no investor capital has ever been lost' claim (Nov 2025) and a verified LP review (Jan 2026) reporting an expected total loss on a Class B position in the co-sponsored Heights on Katy deal, which sold in February 2026 at an undisclosed price. Documented the November 2023 Lone Star 3-pack purchase from Nitya Capital (673 units, $68M CMBS assumption): a verified transaction between two CREsponsor-profiled sponsors.
